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Volume 2, Number 18 (October 9, 1997) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
Yel'tsin address broadsides Duma 
President Boris Yel'tsin chose to mark a particularly grim anniversary, the 
confrontation at the Ostankino Television Station, with a renewed verbal assault 
on the current Duma. In the 1993 confrontation between the executive and 
legislature, Ostankino signaled the descent into armed conflict to resolve the 
dispute. Yel'tsin acknowledged the weighty symbolism of the timing of his 
remarks, but his decision to "speak about the Duma precisely on this day" 
suggests the threat of dissolution underpins his critique. (Official Kremlin 
International News Broadcast, 3 Oct 97; NEXIS.) 
 
The president's specific criticisms include the Duma's adoption of the Land Code, 
which does not permit private ownership of agricultural land; lack of 
parliamentary action on social legislation and the 1998 budget; and interference 
in foreign policy. While certain Duma actions have certainly merited presidential 
concerns, it is astonishing that Yel'tsin would choose to react by threatening a 
return to one of the ugliest chapters in current Russian political history. It is also 
indicative of the tenuousness of Russian democracy that Yel'tsin would rely on 
forced dissolution of the parliament, rather than the appropriate institutional 
recourse. With a functioning Constitutional Court, the Duma's Land Code could 
be overturned as unconstitutional as the right to private ownership of property is 
enshrined in the current constitution. Perhaps President Yel'tsin can yet be 
persuaded to turn his attention to building up democratic institutions, rather than 
tearing them down. 
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GOVERNMENT 
Corruption probes target reformers 
The Moscow City Prosecutor's Office has opened an investigation into the 
financial affairs of former Privatization Committee Chief Alfred Kokh. 
Investigators focused on Kokh following allegations that his handling of the 
Svyazinvest auction was prejudicial. The issue under investigation is a $100,000 
book advance paid to Kokh for a forthcoming economics text. The company 
involved in the transaction allegedly has ties to the winner of the Svyazinvest bid, 
Uneximbank. (The St. Petersburg Times, 6-12 Oct 97) 
 
Also under investigation is former St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoli Sobchak. 
Sobchak had previously been described as only a "key witness" in an ongoing 
probe into corruption in his administration. (St. Petersburg Times, 6-12 Oct 97) 
Last week, however, he was detained and interrogated by the St. Petersburg 
MVD/FSB and suffered heart problems during questioning, which required his 
hospitalization. (Agence France-Presse, 4 Oct 97; clari.net) 
 
President Yel'tsin has made the fight against corruption a central theme in his 
new initiative to reform the economy. It is unlikely, however, that he anticipated 
the first publicized targets would prove to be such high-profile reformers. These 
investigations will undoubtedly cause First Deputy Prime Minister Chubais some 
distress as well, as they are both close allies. The Kokh inquiry is potentially quite 
dangerous, especially if the probe widens to include the conduct of previous state 
property auctions. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Chandler Rosenberger 
 
Primakov will use NATO-Russia council to protect Serb war criminals 
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Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov has said he will use a new NATO-
Russia working commission on peacekeeping to slow down the alliance's pursuit 
of war criminals in the Serbian enclave of Bosnia. 
The first ministerial-level meeting of the NATO-Russia Joint Permanent Council 
established a new working commission on joint peacekeeping missions, including 
the mission in Bosnia. The commission will pass on its first recommendations to 
the next ministerial meeting, scheduled for December 17 in Brussels. (ITAR-
TASS, 1929 GMT, 26 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-269) 
 
"Russia continues to be supportive of the Dayton accords and has an interest in 
having them implemented," Primakov told the Washington Post before the 
council met. "...But I think that the move to arrest war criminals through the use of 
force is not part of the mandate of the multinational force. " (The Washington 
Post, 21 Sep 97). 
 
Following the meeting, Primakov told the German newspaper Bild am Sonntag 
that he intended to use a new working group on peacekeeping missions to 
prevent the arrest of accused Bosnian Serb war criminal Radovan Karadzic as 
long as he remains on the territory of his own ethnic enclave. 
 
"According to the wording of the present mandate," Primakov said, "he can only 
be arrested if he crosses a border that is protected by the troops. I do not think 
that he will do that. . . The SFOR mandate that applies now does not include the 
right to arrest persons by force, even if they have been accused of war crimes." 
(Bild am Sonntag, 28 Sep 97) 
 
Primakov's statement flatly contradicts the findings of a report issued by the 
Center for International Programs at The University of Dayton earlier this year. 
 
"Unequivocal legal authority exists for the United States military personnel to 
engage in operations in Bosnia to apprehend indicted war criminals," the reports 
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states. "Article 29 of the substantive law of The Hague Tribunal mandates the 
arrest or detention, as well as the surrender or transfer, of any accused individual 
to the International Tribunal... Under Rule 40, the Prosecutor is also permitted in 
urgent situations to request the provisional arrest of a suspect even before he or 
she has been formally accused by the International Tribunal. To further the 
success of the International Tribunal's mandate, the Prosecutor, in such 
situations, is also given the power to request 'all necessary measures to prevent 
the escape of a suspect or an accused, injury to or intimidation of a victim or 
witness, or the destruction of evidence.' " (Bringing War Criminals to Justice: 
Obligations, Options, Recommendations. Center for International Programs, 
University of Dayton, 1997) 
 
Primakov claims that neither Russia nor NATO has veto over NATO actions  
In several instances, Primakov's words following the NATO-Russia meeting could 
be taken to mean that he believes the Permanent Joint Council has considerably 
more power over the alliance's affairs than Western diplomats have yet admitted. 
The English-language account of ITAR-TASS's interview with Primakov, for 
example, reported in indirect speech that he believes the Founding Act signed in 
May 1997 gives neither Russia nor NATO a veto over the Council's work. (ITAR-
TASS, 1929 GMT, 26 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-269) American diplomats had 
insisted at the time of the Founding Act's adoption that it gave Russia a "voice, 
not a veto" over NATO affairs. In denying that NATO itself could unilaterally reject 
the council's work, Primakov appears to have suggested that Russia has, de 
facto, a veto over a NATO veto. 
 
In the same interview, Primakov offered Russia's assistance in the presumed 
modification of the Alliance. "We are trying to help the transformation of the 
Alliance with our participation in the Council," he was quoted as saying. 
 
There was no report of NATO extending a request for such aid, but neither was 
Primakov's offer refused. 
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Primakov also frankly portrayed his own country's interest in the council. "Those 
who think that Russia is participating in the NATO-Russia joint standing council in 
order to save its face, are mistaken," he said. "Russia is taking part in the work of 
the Council in order to protect its interests." (RIA Novosti, 27 Sep 97; Johnson's 
Russia List #1240) 
 
In Moscow, French president signs Iranian oil deal 
Visiting Moscow, French President Jacques Chirac signed an economic 
cooperation deal with Russian President Boris Yel'tsin that will help to finance a 
natural gas pipeline from Iran. (The New York Times, 5 Oct 97) 
 
Chirac signed the pipeline deal despite growing evidence that Russia is helping 
the Iranians to develop a long-range ballistic missile that could threaten Israel, 
Saudi Arabia and US troops stationed in the Persian Gulf. (Please see ISCIP 
Editorial Digest, vol. II, no. 17) 
 
As Boris Yel'tsin called for Europe to take a leading role in its own security, and 
blasted "interference from outside Europe," Chirac noted only that his position on 
the Europeanization of NATO lies "somewhat midway" between those of Moscow 
and Washington." He did not object either that the presidents' joint statement 
addressed the issue of Bosnia without mentioning the arrest of suspected war 
criminals. (Liberation, 27 Sep 97; FBIS-WEU-97-272) 
 
Russia, US agree extension of deadline for START-II compliance... 
The United States and Russia agreed on 26 September to extend the deadline 
for compliance with the START-II Treaty by five years, from the beginning of 
2003 to the end of 2007. The two countries also agreed that START-III, a treaty 
on further reductions, must be signed before January 2003. 
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The START-II Treaty sets the reduction ceilings at 3,000 to 3,500 warheads for 
each side, while START-III sets them at 2,000 to 2,500 warheads. 
 
START-II has not yet been ratified by the Russian Duma. Russian Defense 
Minister Igor Sergeev and Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov met with heads of 
Duma factions on 17 September, in an effort to convince them that Russia could 
not in any case afford to maintain the current arsenals. (Rossiyskiye vesti, 17 
Sep 97; FBIS-TAC-97-260) 
 
Sergeev also assured the commanders of the Moscow military garrison that 
Russia's strategic arsenal would remain the guarantor of the nation's security. 
(Interfax, 1051 GMT, 24 Sep 97; FBIS-UMA-97-267) 
 
A spokesman of the Strategic Missile Troops said that the extension of the 
START-II deadline would allow Russia to keep its arsenal of SS-19 rockets until 
the end of their usefulness, and will allow Russia to deploy the Topol-M missile, 
now in development, at the moment of its readiness. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 
0907 GMT, 25 Sep 97; FBIS-UMA-97-268) 
 
Meanwhile, the United States, Russia, and three ex-Soviet republics on 26 
September signed amendments to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that had been 
drafted in August (Please see ISCIP Editorial Digest, vol. II, no. 16). 
(Nezavisimaya gazeta, 1 Oct 97; Johnson's Russia List #1247). 
 
Russian mafia: a threat to the West... 
Normal relations with the Russian government will become impossible if a 
network of criminal gangs and corrupt officials succeed in creating "an emergent 
Russian criminal-syndicalist state," a report by the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) predicts. 
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"In many respects such a criminal-syndicalist state already exists in Russia 
today," said the CSIS panel, citing government, business and academic leaders. 
Corruption pervades "every level of Russia's bureaucracy," the report said, and is 
the major obstacle to defeating organized crime. (Reuters, 29 Sep 97; Johnson's 
Russia List, #1243) 
 
...and active in Colombia 
Russian organized crime groups are establishing alliances with Colombian drug 
traffickers that will allow delivery of narcotics to Europe and sophisticated 
weaponry to Latin American criminals, according to The Washington Post. 
 
The Russian criminals have already attempted to sell the traffickers a submarine, 
helicopters and surface-to-air missiles, the Post said. 
 
"The Russians, along with the Nigerians, are the most threatening criminal 
organization based in the United States," White House drug policy director Barry 
R. McCaffrey told the newspaper. (Associated Press, 29 Sep 97; Johnson's 
Russia List #1241) 
 
Meeting Mubarak, Yel'tsin decries Israel's "rigid stance" on Middle East 
Following meetings with Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, Russian President 
Boris Yel'tsin complained that the crisis in the Middle East was largely the result 
of "the rigid stance of Israel." 
 
Accusing Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat of staging acts of terrorism, Yel'tsin said, 
was "ridiculous." (Interfax, 1035 GMT, 23 Sep 97) 
 
In a joint statement that repeated the rhetoric of the Russian foreign minister, 
Yel'tsin and Mubarak argued that overweening influence of the United States 
upset the balance of power in the world. Speaking afterwards, Yel'tsin elaborated 
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in comments that reflected the doctrine of "multipolarity" frequently advanced by 
his foreign minister. 
 
"As for the idea that one country preaches to several others, telling them what to 
do -- no," Yel'tsin said. "There is the United States, one region; Africa with Egypt, 
another region; Latin America, another; Asia, Japan, China, a world of many 
regions." (NTV, 1500 GMT, 23 Sep 97) 
 
Comment: 
Who are Russia's criminals? 
In both the popular imagination and in most of the scholarly community, post-
Communist Russia is portrayed as a typical case of "primitive capitalism." A weak 
government struggles in vain against unscrupulous gang leaders, who, being half 
Al Capone and half J.P. Morgan, write the rules of post-Soviet life to suit their 
accumulative appetites. 
 
In The Peacemaker, Hollywood's latest attempt to grope through the wreckage of 
the Cold War, George Clooney and Nicole Kidman chase "rogue elements" in the 
Russian military who are trying to sell nuclear warheads. In the latest study from 
the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the next threat to world order 
is forecast to be a "criminal-syndicalist" state that binds the Kremlin to 
international drug cartels. 
 
All of which brings to mind the answer that a Polish philosopher gave when 
asked if the growth of crime in his native land after the collapse of Communism 
bothered him. 
 
"What you don't understand," he replied, "is that the Communist state itself was a 
criminal conspiracy, one that had a complete monopoly on all the activities that 
have since been spread among mafiosi. The amount of crime has not increased -
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- if anything, it has decreased, now that the main criminal gang, the Party, has 
been broken up." 
 
Given the recent activities of Russia's foreign minister, it is perhaps time to 
abandon our search for a sexy new enemy, and return to the dull work of fending 
off plodding, yet persistent, foes. The Peacemaker portrays a Russian general 
who inadvertently helps a Balkan terrorist. As they used to say at the New York 
Times, "interesting, if true." Back in the real world, we find that the Russian 
foreign minister, representative of the supposedly weak state itself, is working 
consciously to protect Radovan Karadzic, Balkan Terrorist Number One. 
 
Yevgeni Primakov has made his intentions clear. He will use his influence in 
Western organizations, especially the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, to 
subvert attempts to arrest Bosnian Serb war criminals. He will sell missile 
technology to the mullahs of Iran. He will woo European governments away from 
the trans-Atlantic alliance. And he will do it all to "protect Russia's interests." 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH 
Luzhkov faction said to be emerging in the Duma 
Supposedly, the faction will include more than 35 deputies representing the 
Moscow Region in the lower house of parliament according to Sergei 
Kalashnikov, chairman of the State Duma Committee for Labor and Social Policy. 
Kalashnikov noted that there are no real (that is, ideological) parties in 
contemporary Russia that would represent the interests of specific social groups 
and that there only is a "constellation of prominent political leaders." Seen in this 
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light, a Luzhkov bloc is unsurprising and, arguably, overdue (Trud, 1-7 Aug 97; 
FBIS-SOV-97-216) 
 
REGIONS 
Presidential appointments to the regions continue 
At the end of July the president appointed Valeri Sychov to the post of 
plenipotentiary representative in the Ulyanovsk region (ITAR-TASS, 0659 GMT, 
3 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-215). Yel'tsin also appointed Vladimir Ilyich Gaydukov to 
the same post in the Bryansk Region (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1130 GMT, 8 
Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-220). Aleksandr Vladimirovich Orlov was similarly 
appointed in the Kaliningrad Region a few weeks later (ITAR-TASS World 
Service, 0820 GMT, 13 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-225) 
 
The role of the president's regional representatives continually evolves. At first, 
resented by the regions as evidence of Moscow's heavy-handed politics, it has 
become clear to many regional leaders that having a direct line of communication 
to the Kremlin could be beneficial. The regional representatives are in a difficult 
position since they must concurrently please the president while needing to 
cooperate with the region's leaders if they are to be useful. Functioning 
effectively as the president's ambassadors to the regions, these representatives 
are in a position to be of great help -- especially now while center-region relations 
are in such flux. 
 
Irkutsk has a new governor 
Boris Yel'tsin sent a telegram to Irkutsk Region's Governor Boris Govorin. The 
president congratulated Govorin on his "convincing victory" and noted that the 
election was an indication of the voters' desire for continued "economic reform 
and [the] strengthening of its social orientation." A governor welcome to Yel'tsin 
in the independence-minded East must be comforting, however, such 
independence will also limit Moscow's influence. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 
1724 GMT, 4 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-216). 
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MEDIA 
Leftists form their own news agency 
During a news conference marking the first anniversary of the establishment of 
the People's Patriotic Union of Russia (NPSR), journalists were introduced to the 
Patriotic News Agency (Agentstvo Patrioticheskoy Informatsii-API). 
 
The decision to set up the API was made by the NPSR. The agency has already 
begun operations, according to the NPSR press service. Gennadi Zyuganov is, 
not surprisingly, very supportive of the development -- perhaps unaware that he 
is conceivably as likely a target of the API's partisan wrath as anyone. 
 
Zyuganov claimed that parties of the left and "patriotic" forces were publishing at 
present some 300 newspapers and magazines and running three radio stations 
(Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service, 1300 GMT, 8 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-220) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Dwyer Dennis and CDR Curtis Stevens 
 
Suitcase "nukes" issue will not go away 
General Lebed's repeated accusations that the former Soviet Union 
manufactured over 100 suitcase-size nuclear weapons and that some of these 
weapons are unaccounted for will not go away. Although some skeptics point out 
that Lebed may be using his accusations to bolster his year 2000 presidential 
bid, others believe there may be some cause for concern. 
 
Aleksei Yablokov, a prominent environmentalist and former environmental 
advisor to President Yel'tsin, said the bombs were built for the KGB and were 
never under the control of the military. The defense ministry has consistently 
claimed there are no such weapons in its nuclear arsenal and that all nuclear 
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weapons are accounted for and under strict controls. At a meeting of NATO 
defense ministers in Maastricht, Defense Minister Sergeev told his American 
counterpart that he would be glad to have General Habiger, Commander of the 
US Strategic Command, come to Russia and inspect the way nuclear weapons 
are stored. 
 
Despite all the official assurances from both Moscow and Washington that 
Russian nuclear weapons are under tight control, doubts persist in both capitals. 
Senator Lugar stated "The Russian inventory system is so antiquated and 
inefficient that the Russians do not have an accurate count of nuclear weapons 
or materials." (Reuters, 1344 PDT, 2 Oct 97; clari.net) Both the Defense 
Department and the FBI have stated there is no evidence of missing nuclear 
weapons or nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists or rogue states. 
(Agence France-Press, 21, 26 Sep 97, 1-2 Oct 97; clari.net; ITAR-TASS, 1313 
GMT, 22 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-265) 
 
Nuclear weapons workers get paid 
In addition to answering concerns over nuclear weapons, the Russian 
government has grappled with problems at two of its leading nuclear weapons 
laboratories. At Arzamas-16 in the city of Sarov, layoffs have been reported and 
crime has been increasing in what was once a crime-free city. The average 
worker's wage at Arzamas-16 had dropped below the subsistence level and most 
workers have not been paid since 1996. On 30 September the Russian 
government announced that it had transferred sufficient funds to Arzamas-16 and 
Chelyabinsk-70 to settle all the wage arrears at the two nuclear centers. Prime 
Minister Chernomyrdin said the actions taken would settle nearly 80 percent of 
the wages owed for the first nine months of 1997. The shortfall in paying workers 
at the two nuclear facilities developed as money was only available to make 
partial payments to the military. (Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 29 Aug-4 
Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-262; ITAR-TASS, 0854 GMT, 30 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-
273) 
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Revelations made at Sputnik anniversary 
October 4 marked the fortieth anniversary of the Sputnik launch. At a NASA 
conference marking the anniversary, Sergei Khrushchev, son of the late Soviet 
Premier Nikita Khrushchev, said his farther had decided to accept President 
Kennedy's 1963 invitation to participate in a joint US-USSR mission to place a 
man on the moon. Although the Khrushchev government rejected Kennedy's 
proposals, Khrushchev began having second doubts and reversed himself in 
early November 1963, according to his son. Kennedy's assassination and 
Khrushchev's ouster in 1964 prevented any public announcement of the decision. 
(Christian Science Monitor, 30 Sep 97; clari.net) 
 
Baturin to travel in 1998 
In other space news the Russian government announced that Yuri Baturin would 
travel to the Mir space station in 1998. Baturin is an advisor to President Yel'tsin 
and serves on the Defense Council. Although a lawyer by trade, he studied 
aerophysics and space research at the Moscow Technical Institute in the early 
1970's. (Agence France-Press, 2 Oct 97, clari.net) 
 
Border troops train to fight illegal migration 
A summation of the recent "Baltic Guard '97," a wide-scale international 
operation to fight illegal migration in the Baltic Sea, was provided in an Strazh 
Baltiki interview with Lieutenant General Yevgeni Bolkhovitin. Bolkhovitin is the 
commander of the Kaliningrad Border Group. He stated that the operation was 
supported by eight countries of the Baltic region. Both the coast guards and 
corresponding border services of Russia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Sweden, 
Germany, Denmark, and Poland took part. He pointed out that illegal migration 
was a serious issue for all participants, adding that "shipping Asian, African, and 
Latin American citizens to Europe is a wide-scale business among mafia 
structures." 
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According to Bolkhovitin, more than 3,000 people were involved, including 250 
border troops and two ships, and the operation consisted of identifying and 
inspecting approximately 100 fishing ships. Revealing no specific head-count on 
detained illegal immigrants, Bolkhovitin stated that besides identifying the routes 
and scale of migration, the operation signified the cooperation between Baltic 
states' border services. (Strazh Baltiki, 9 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-260) 
 
In an apparent effort to further this cooperation, Andrei Nikolaev, Director of the 
Russian Federal Border Service, and Marie Hastrom, general director of the 
Swedish Coastal Guard Service, signed a protocol on 19 September which seeks 
to deepen cooperation in fighting illegal migration and smuggling, protecting the 
environment, monitoring navigation, and observing fishing regulations. This type 
of cooperation is seen as fundamental in forming a system of non-military 
security in the Baltic Sea region. (ITAR-TASS, 0751 GMT, 19 Sep 97; FBIS-
SOV-97-263) 
 
Russian-Moldova-Transdniestr discussions on military hardware continue 
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Valeri Serov held talks with the leaders of 
Moldova and the Transdniestr Moldovan Republic on 22-24 September to 
determine the disposition of Russian military and engineering hardware amassed 
in the Transdniestr region. The equipment cache is a result of Russian troop 
withdrawal from Germany and Poland and the assets of the former 14th Russian 
Army. (Interfax, 1732 GMT, 22 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-265) Serov called for an 
urgent evacuation of "special assets" from the region. Serov was quoted as 
saying, "The presence of such large amounts of special military assets on such a 
small territory as Moldova is inadmissible, and we must do the best we can to 
withdraw them as soon as possible." (Basapress, 1900 GMT, 22 Sep 97; FBIS-
SOV-97-266) 
 
The arsenal of hardware and munitions includes: 54 railroad carloads of guided 
anti-tank missiles, 83 pieces of artillery, over 1200 tons of explosives, 119 tanks, 
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43 infantry combat vehicles, 112 armored personnel carriers, 220 anti-aircraft 
mobile missile systems, 33 mobile anti-tank missile systems, carloads of 
munitions, 30,000 assault rifles, machine guns, and sidearms, and 35 carloads of 
non-military material, according to an unnamed Interfax source in the Russian 
government. Transdniestr leaders have wanted control over most of the assets 
and some pressure groups plan to block the withdrawal of military hardware from 
the region. (Interfax, 1732 GMT, 22 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-265) 
 
Additionally, the future of the arsenals of the limited contingent of Russian troops 
currently deployed in the region is still a point of discussion. Moldova's Defense 
Minister, Valeriu Pasat, described the situation (of the contingent's presence) as 
"getting more and more difficult." (Basapress, 1900 GMT, 22 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-
97-266) 
 
The meeting closed with no accord, but Serov appeared positive, directing that 
specific implementation proposals be developed within the next ten days. The 
Moldovan president was reported to be satisfied with Moscow's position. Igor 
Smirnov, a Dniestr leader, while still maintaining that the equipment is the 
property of the Dniestr people, stated that the issue amounted to an economic 
question. His position is that, after Russia takes what it needs, the surplus should 
be sold and profits plowed into the Dniestr's economy. (Basapress, 1700 GMT, 
24 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-268) 
 
With the current track record of privatization embezzlement in Russia, it will be 
very interesting to see where the market is for the sale and how the profits will 
get into the economy. The issue of maintaining a Russian troop contingent is still 
open. 
 
Greece hosts Russian warplanes for first time 
On 16 September, an air wing of the Russian Air Defense Troops consisting of 
two Su-30s, two Su-27, and an Il-76 arrived in Greece at the Tangara air force 
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base. Piloting one of the fighters was Commander of Aviation of the Air Defense 
Troops, Colonel General Vladimir Andreev, who is leading the delegation. Greek 
Minister of National Defense Apostolos Tsokhatzopoulos said that "the presence 
of Russian pilots and their cooperation ...is...a signal to other European 
nations..." of the need to cooperate to ensure security. A Greek delegation was 
also in Moscow simultaneously, discussing increased technical cooperation to 
include arm sales. Tsokhatzopoulos suggested that the Greek Air Force is 
considering adopting Russian warplanes. (ITAR-TASS, 0955 GMT, 17 Sep 97; 
FBIS-SOV-97-260) 
 
From a NATO member perspective, it is unclear where Tsokhatzopoulos sees 
any shortfall in security. While Russia may fear NATO expansion, it is unclear 
what security is gained by a NATO country having unilateral joint exercises and 
arms sales discussions with Russia. One result of this event will likely be a 
feeling of lessened security on the part of another NATO member, Turkey. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Mark Jones 
 
CIS presidents comment on relations within the Commonwealth 
Several CIS presidents made disparaging remarks concerning the 
commonwealth in recent days. Although this is nothing new for the presidents of 
Ukraine and Belarus, it is a shift from the tacit approval the Uzbek leader has 
until now given the organization. Uzbek President Islam Karimov reserved his 
harshest words for Moscow. "Not everyone in Russia has renounced the imperial 
vision with regard to the former USSR republics, and it is still being witnessed 
even among the (Russian) leadership," he noted. He went on to say that relations 
in the CIS have been built "according to Russia's desire" and not based on the 
principal of parity originally called for in the CIS Charter (Interfax, 17 Sep 97; 
FBIS-SOV-97-260). 
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Leonid Kuchma of Ukraine was more prognostic in his statements. Referring to 
Russian dominance of, and the low level of cooperation in, the commonwealth, 
he said, "If it goes on like this, I do not believe in the future of the CIS" (Interfax, 
27 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-270). 
 
Alyaksandr Lukashenka of Belarus had similar thoughts, commenting that the 
CIS may break up in two or three years if no changes in policy are made. His 
solution to rejuvenate the organization includes developing "machinery to 
implement decisions" of the CIS bodies. In other words, he wants a supranational 
enforcement arm for the CIS Heads of State, Government, and Parliamentary 
Assembly to use (Interfax, 1 Oct 97: FBIS-SOV-97-274). 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Mark Jones 
 
Kiev, Minsk reach border demarcation accord 
A joint Ukrainian-Belarusian commission hammered out an agreement on 
delimitation and demarcation of the countries' common border. The accord will 
govern "the behavior of the sides in carrying out work on the border." The 
demarcation, which may be completed as early as 1999, will include the 
emplacement of marking poles at 1 km intervals along the length of the 
boundary. Both sides expressed optimism that the agreement, which must be 
signed by both governments, will "definitely settle all problematic questions of the 
border between the two states" (Belapan, 25 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-268). 
 
Ukraine, Moldova to "exchange territories" for 99 years 
According to a Basapress report (24 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-268), Moldova and 
Ukraine will exchange territories for a period of 99 years. The agreement was 
reached in Odessa by Moldovan President Lucinschi and the leadership of the 
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Odessa administration. Under the accord, Ukraine will administer a portion of the 
Odessa-Ismail thoroughfare which lies close to the Moldovan village of Palanca. 
In exchange, Moldova will administer the area near the Basarabeasca offices of 
Moldova's railways 
 
BELARUS 
Bad news for Belarus... 
The European Union Council of Ministers decided to limit political and economic 
ties with Belarus. Belarus' foreign ministry released a statement condemning the 
decision and stating that it puts "direct pressure on the development of internal 
political processes in a sovereign country" (Interfax, 22 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-
265). 
 
...And for its leader 
President Lukashenka was informed that he will not be invited to represent his 
country at the Summit of the Council of Europe to be held on 10 October in 
Strasbourg. France is hosting the event and currently has the chair of the Council 
of Ministers. Explaining the snub, the French delegate minister for European 
affairs pointed out that the "trend of developments in Belarus gives no grounds 
for reinstating ... its special guest status." The only other European country 
denied representation was Yugoslavia (Belapan, 24 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-267). 
 
Lukashenka was snubbed further when his planned visit to the Russian regions 
of Lipetsk and Yaroslavl, scheduled for October 2-4, was canceled by the 
Kremlin. President Yel'tsin ordered the Russian air control system to deny access 
to Lukashenka's plane. Explaining his action to journalists, Yel'tsin claimed that 
Lukashenka had failed to "coordinate" the visit with him and then added: "Let him 
first release [Russian ORT TV correspondent] Sheremet. So there!" (Monitor, 3 
Oct 97). 
 
Official travels to Iran 
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Belarusian Leonid Rachkov, Chairman of the Parliamentary Commission for 
International Affairs and Ties with CIS States, met with Deputy Speaker of the 
Islamic Consultative Assembly, Hasan Rowhani, in Tehran recently. The officials 
discussed economic issues and elaborated on the expansion of relations 
between Tehran and Minsk since the breakup of the USSR. Rachkov called for 
the formation of a parliamentary friendship council between the two countries. 
 
UKRAINE  
NATO-Kiev information link established 
An information system linking Kiev to NATO's information network has been 
established. The purpose of the link is to ensure proper coordination within the 
framework of the "Partnership for Peace" program and peace-keeping 
operations. The system includes a satellite station, a central computer-server and 
terminals linked to NATO's PIMS center. The system was installed in the 
Verification Center of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (Interfax, 23 Sep 97; FBIS-
SOV-97-266). 
 
MOLDOVA 
Symbolism in Dniestr 
The leader of the unrecognized Dniestr republic signed documents adopting the 
flag of the former Soviet Republic of Moldova, complete with hammer and sickle, 
as the official emblem of the region. He also adopted a new national anthem, the 
lyrics of which are written in Russian. Smirnov promised, however, that versions 
written in Moldovan and Ukrainian will soon follow (Basapress, 20 Sep 97: FBIS-
SOV-97-263). 
 
Serov leaves without accord on arms division 
Russian Deputy Premier Valeri Serov traveled to Moldova to meet with Petru 
Lucinschi and Igor Smirnov. The purpose of the visit was to discuss the status of 
the 14th Army's equipment currently stationed east of the Dniestr river. Serov 
was not able to broker an agreement amenable to both sides. As the discussions 
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broke up, Smirnov insisted he would block the removal of the equipment and 
further said he expected the issue to be resolved only through Tiraspol-Moscow 
negotiations (Basapress, 24 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-268). The value of the arms 
was estimated at $4 billion two years ago. In addition to tons of outdated 
ammunition, at least 83 artillery pieces, 119 tanks, 43 infantry fighting vehicles, 
112 armored personnel carriers, 220 anti-aircraft systems, and 14 Grad multiple 
rocket launchers are stored in the unrecognized Dniestr republic (Interfax, 22 
Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-265). 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
Kazakhstan, China sign their own "deal of the century" 
On 24 September, Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng and President Nazarbaev 
witnessed the signing of an agreement which the Kazakh president has called 
the "contract of the century." According to the terms of this contract, the China 
National Petroleum Company (the company which won the tenders to two of 
Kazakhstan's oil fields last June -- see Editorial Digest on Central Asia for July 
1997) and Kazakhstan's Ministry of Energy will cooperate in the development of 
three of Kazakhstan's hydrocarbon deposits located in Aktyubinsk Region (the 
fields of Aktyubmunaigaz hold approximately 130 million tonnes of oil in proven 
reserves) (Interfax, 1600 GMT, 26 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-269) and in the Uzen 
oil field (Kazakhstan's second largest oil deposit) on the Mangyshlak Peninsula. 
In conjunction with the development of the three deposits, the China National Oil 
Company will undertake the construction of two new pipelines. One pipeline will 
need to be built from Aktyubinsk Region to China's western border 
(approximately 3,000 km) (ITAR-TASS, 1834 GMT, 24 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-
267), and the second pipeline will reach from Kazakhstan to the Turkmen border 
(250 km) for eventual extension to Iran. Starting and ending dates for the 
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pipelines' construction were not given in the agreement, however, the 
construction of the Aktyubinsk-China pipeline is to begin immediately and should 
be ready for full operation by 30 June 2005. The Chinese oil company 
representatives agreed to include a statement in the contract, whereby they 
pledge to complete the actual building of the pipeline by 1 January 2005 
(Interfax, 1405 GMT, 24 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-267). 
 
According to the agreement, the China National Oil Company is allocated five 
years for the pipeline's construction, with an additional 2.5 years in case of 
unforeseeable delays. If the pipeline is not finished within this amount of time, all 
of China's investments will remain in Kazakhstan. The construction of the 
pipeline between Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan is expected to require only one 
year and will be carried out by a consortium including China, Kazakhstan, and 
possibly Turkmenistan and Iran, according to Kazakhstan's Acting Prime 
Minister, Akhmetzhan Yesimov. The total cost of the pipelines' construction, as 
well as the development of the oil deposits themselves is estimated at $9.5 billion 
(Interfax, 0958 GMT, 25 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-268). 
 
Comment 
Once these two pipelines are completed, Kazakhstan will have two additional 
access routes to the international oil market (assuming that the Kazakh-Turkmen 
pipeline is connected to Iran), and will no longer need to depend solely on Russia 
in order to export oil. Thus, President Nazarbaev's efforts to establish good 
relations with a country strong enough to provide a counterweight to Russia's still 
considerable influence may finally be coming to fruition, especially when one 
considers reports that the Chinese government also wants to increase its military 
cooperation with Kazakhstan. Of course, there are still potential obstacles to the 
further development of Kazakh-Chinese relations. The Russian government may 
try to hinder the implementation of the pipeline projects and exert pressure on the 
Kazakh government to distance itself from China. A second issue to consider is 
the Uighur separatist movement in northern China, which also has supporters in 
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Kazakhstan. The Chinese government's conflict with its Uighur population has 
intensified in recent months and although the Kazakh government has officially 
declared its opposition to all separatist movements, it has not made any real 
efforts to crack down on Uighur separatist groups in Kazakhstan. This has 
caused some anger among various Chinese officials, although it has not yet 
affected Kazakh-Chinese relations at the highest level. Furthermore, should the 
Aktyubinsk-China pipeline pass through any part of Xinjiang (the province where 
most of China's Uighur population still lives), the Uighur separatists' leverage 
over the Chinese government would increase dramatically. 
 
Kazakhstan, Italy to sign oil agreement 
In a press release issued by Kazakhstan's Foreign Ministry, President Nazarbaev 
and Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi confirmed their governments' 
commitment to finalize the contract between the Italian National Oil Company 
(AGIP), Texaco, British Gas, and Kazakhstan for their joint development of the 
Karachaganak oil field (located in northern Kazakhstan). The contract is 
scheduled to be signed by 30 October 1997 and, according to Prime Minister 
Prodi, all remaining difficulties regarding the contract concern the logistical 
problems of transporting the oil across a number of other countries to the sea, 
and not from any obstacles in the Kazakh government's relationship with AGIP. 
Once the Karachaganak oil field is fully operational, it will be able to produce over 
20 billion cubic meters of gas and 10 million tons of crude oil and byproducts per 
year. The finalization of this oil contract was one of Prime Minister Prodi's main 
goals during his September visit to Kazakhstan (Il Sole-24 Ore (Internet Version), 
17 Sep 97; FBIS-WEU-97-261). 
 
Kazakhstan will protest Russian development of Caspian reserves 
In an interview with Nezavisimaya gazeta, Kazakh Foreign Minister 
Qosymzhomart Toqaev stated that the Kazakh government would make an 
official protest to Russia's Ministry of Natural Resources over its planned 
development of a number of offshore oil and gas reserves in the Caspian Sea. 
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Part of these reserves fall under Kazakhstan's jurisdiction, and although Toqaev 
stated that he would be willing to allow Russian companies to develop the 
Kazakh sector of the Caspian reserves, a violation of Kazakhstan's sovereign 
rights would not be tolerated (Interfax, 1636 GMT, 18 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-
261). 
 
TAJIKISTAN 
Refugee repatriation partially completed 
7,000 Tajik refugees have been repatriated thus far, leaving at least another 
7,000 still in Afghanistan. The repatriation process began on 17 August, under 
the terms of the General Agreement on Inter-Tajik peace. Three checkpoints 
were established to handle the returning refugees: one at Nizhnyi Pyandzh 
(located on the Tajik-Afghan border), one in Ishkashim (a town in Gorno-
Badakhshon Oblast', close to the Afghan border), and one near the Kampe-Sahi 
(Afghanistan) - Termez (Uzbekistan) passage. Half of the refugees have returned 
to Tajikistan via the Nizhnyi Pyandzh checkpoint; the last group crossed the 
border on 25 September. Another 7,000 are waiting in Kampe-Sahi. Their return 
home is prevented by a new outbreak of fighting between the Taleban and 
General Abdumalik's (General Dostum's former ally) anti-Taleban forces. 
Repatriation via the Ishkashim checkpoint also has not yet begun. The National 
Reconciliation Commission hopes to have the repatriation process fully 
completed by the end of December, including the return of the UTO troops who 
still remain in Afghanistan (Interfax, 1051 GMT, 25 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-268). 
Their return has been the subject of considerable controversy among Tajik 
military commanders, even leading to acts of mutiny against the government (see 
Editorial Digests on Central Asia for July and August 1997). 
 
Comment 
Although it is certainly a positive sign that so many refugees have returned to 
Tajikistan over the past two months, their repatriation is only the first step of what 
will undoubtedly prove to be a long and difficult process of reintegration into 
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society. Many of the refugees will need immediate shelter, food, and medical 
care, as well as permanent housing (many houses were destroyed during the 
war), jobs and schools in the long run. Tajikistan's budget does not appear to be 
able to meet even these needs, judging by President Rahmonov's recent appeal 
for additional funding at a 25 September meeting in Dushanbe with deputy envoy 
of the UN secretary-general in Tajikistan Paolo Lembo. President Rahmonov 
particularly stressed the need for outside financial support to aid in Tajikistan's 
socioeconomic development, as well as continued support of the inter-Tajik 
peace process. A UN-sponsored international conference is planned for the end 
of October, to discuss what type of economic aid to provide for Tajikistan now 
that the civil war has ended. The UN has already asked donor countries to 
contribute $64 million in development aid to Tajikistan (Interfax, 1559 GMT, 28 
Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-268). 
 
In addition to the financial strain that the refugees' return poses for the Tajik 
government, it could also result in considerable social strain. Those refugees 
who choose to return to their home towns and villages may come into conflict 
with the current inhabitants of those communities. Many of the houses 
abandoned by the refugees when they fled during the war were appropriated by 
others, who will probably not be inclined to return their new homes to the original 
owners. Furthermore, a large number of the refugees were driven out of their 
communities because of acts of violence committed against them by other 
members of the same community. Reestablishing normal relations between the 
refugees and those responsible for causing them to flee will be very difficult and 
could lead to further violent incidents. 
 
UZBEKISTAN 
Afghan missiles strike Uzbekistan 
On 18 September, 10 rocket shells fired in clashes between the Taleban and 
anti-Taleban forces led by General Dostum's former ally, General Abdumalik, 
landed in the Uzbek city of Termez, leaving three people seriously injured (ITAR-
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TASS, 1641 GMT, 18 Sep 97; FBIS-UMA-97-261). On 19 September, a 
spokesman for the Uzbek Foreign Ministry flatly denied rumors that Taleban 
forces had actually crossed over into Uzbek territory during their attack on the 
Afghan town of Hairaton (located across the Amudarya River from Termez). The 
spokesman further stated that Uzbek border guards were in complete control of 
that section of the Uzbek-Afghan border (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1216 GMT, 
19 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-262). This portion of the Afghan-Uzbek border was 
subsequently sealed by Uzbekistan's border guards, an action no doubt intended 
as a safeguard to keep the violence from spilling over onto Uzbek territory, but 
which has also had the unfortunate consequence of cutting off the Tajik refugees 
waiting in camps near Mazar-i-Sharif from their planned route of return to 
Tajikistan (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 2 Oct 97). The original plan was for this group of 
refugees to return to Tajikistan through the Kampe-Sahi (Afghanistan) - Termez 
(Uzbekistan) corridor, but now an alternative route must be sought. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
Governments just say "no" to Russia's offer for protection 
During the international forum on "Peaceful Coexistence of Nations and Good 
Neighbour Relations" held in Vilnius in early September, Russian Prime Minister 
Viktor Chernomyrdin once again offered to provide security for the Baltic states. 
In his speech, Chernomyrdin explained what he saw as the benefits of Baltic 
isolation: "[I]n our opinion, the non-alignment of the Baltic nations will give Russia 
a chance to make new additional and concrete steps towards strengthening trust 
and security in the region." (ITAR-TASS, 0708 GMT, 5 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-
248). Alas, the presidents of the three Baltic states were quick to point out that 
their views on NATO membership differed significantly from that of Russia. 
However, Lithuania's Algirdas Brazauskas was pleased to note that 
Chernomyrdin's proposal demonstrated "the peace-loving mood in Russia 
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regarding neighbouring countries." (Interfax, 1857 GMT, 5 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-
97-248) 
 
ESTONIA 
Training tragedy leads to resignations 
Estonia's three top defense leaders have tendered their resignations in the wake 
of the training tragedy that ended with the deaths of 14 soldiers on 11 September 
(Agence France-Presse, 1401 PDT, 16 Sep 97; clari.net; Monitor, 18 Sep 97). 
Defense Minister Andrus Oovel, Maj. Gen. Johannes Kert, the commander of the 
army, and Toomas Kitsing, the defense ministry's chancellor, submitted 
resignations after 14 members of the Estonian contingent to the Baltic 
Peacekeeping Battalion drowned while on maneuvers. The soldiers were 
undergoing training exercises off the coast of Paldiski when bad weather caused 
conditions for crossing the strait to change dramatically. Eight soldiers of the 22-
man reconnaissance team survived. (Agence France-Presse, 1421 PDT, 11 Sep 
97; clari.net)The drowning incident was not the end of the military's woes. The 
following week, 18 Estonian soldiers went absent without leave for over 24 hours, 
reportedly for a drinking party. Later, three soldiers from an Estonian 
peacekeeping platoon, serving in Bosnia with a Danish platoon, were sent home 
due to "disciplinary problems." (Monitor, 18 Sep 97) Col. Oskar Mark, acting chief 
of staff of the military, subsequently denied that there was any crisis in the 
defense forces. (Estonian Television Network, 1845 GMT, 18 Sep 97; FBIS-
UMA-97-261) 
 
Rights of non-citizens under revision 
The treatment of non-citizens in Estonia continues to garner attention and has 
begun to prompt action, although apparently not sufficiently for some. President 
Lennart Meri has promised that the country will have implemented OSCE 
recommendations on human rights by year's end. (Radio Tallinn Network, 1600 
GMT, 5 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-248). In an address to the Paasikivi Society in 
Finland, Meri promised that citizenship requirements would ease, and noted that 
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some requirements of the qualifying examinations already had been loosened. 
(Radio Tallinn Network, 1200 GMT, 4 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-248) The parliament 
began to institute changes shortly thereafter, first by extending the amount of 
time until Estonian becomes the official language in what are now Russian-
language schools (the original deadline of the year 2000 has been amended to 
2007) (Radio Tallinn Network, 1700 GMT, 10 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-253), and 
then exempting some Russian-language television programs from regulations 
which required an Estonian translation accompaniment (Radio Tallinn Network, 
0900 GMT, 11 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-254). 
 
These changes do not meet the expectations of some observers, notably 
Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, who alluded to alleged continued 
rights violations in the Baltic states during the Vilnius conference on "Good 
Neighbourly Relations," and EU parliamentarian Jorn Donner, who proposed in 
August that Estonia establish Russian as an official language and ease up on 
citizenship requirements. Donner's bilingualism proposal set off uproars in his 
native Finland and, not surprisingly, in Estonia as well. The Russian-language 
media in Estonia, on the other hand, welcomed the proposal by Donner, who was 
described in one publication as a "person with a wide vision." (Helsingen 
Sanomat, 9 Aug 97; FBIS-WEU-97-240) 
 
 
Copyright Boston University Trustees 1997 
Unless otherwise indicated, all articles appearing in this journal were written especially for 
Analyst. This article was originally published at 
http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol2/ed18.html. 
